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CP-ABE with Constant-Size Keys for
Lightweight Devices
Fuchun Guo, Yi Mu, Senior Member, IEEE, Willy Susilo∗, Senior Member, IEEE, Duncan S. Wong, and
Vijay Varadharajan, Senior Member, IEEE,
Abstract—Lightweight devices such as RFID tags have
a limited storage capacity, which has become a bottleneck
for many applications, especially for security applications.
Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a
promising cryptographic tool where the encryptor can decide
the access structure that will be used to protect the sensitive
data. However, current CP-ABE schemes suffer from the issue
of having long decryption keys, in which the size is linear to
and dependent on the number of attributes. This drawback
prevents the use of lightweight devices in practice as a storage
of the decryption keys of CP-ABE for users. In this paper,
we provide an affirmative answer to the above long standing
issue, which will make CP-ABE very practical. We propose
a novel CP-ABE scheme with constant-size decryption keys
independent of the number of attributes. We found that the
size can be as small as 672 bits. In comparison with other
schemes in the literature, the proposed scheme is the only
CP-ABE with expressive access structures, which is suitable
for CP-ABE key storage in lightweight devices.
Index Terms—Information Security, Encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
Lightweight devices such as Radio Frequency Identifica-
tion (RFID) tags have many applications such as electronic
passports, ID cards and secret data storage. (e.g., crypto-
graphic key storage, as described in Fig. 1). As shown in
Fig. 1, the authority generates decryption keys of users and
stores them in an RFID tag embedded within a user’s ID
card. The user can extract the key from his/her ID card for
a security use.
Lightweight devices usually have limited memory capac-
ity. For example, a passive RFID tag only offers a storage
of few kilo bits [1]. This has become a major challenge to
applications such as key storage. Many encryption systems
can offer short decryption keys. For example, identity-based
broadcast encryption [2], identity-based encryption with
traitor tracing [3], multi-identity single-key decryption [4],
[5], [6]. Unfortunately, there is no any efficient attribute-
based encryption scheme in the literature, which offers
short decryption keys.
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Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an extension of
identity-based encryption [7] which allows users to en-
crypt and decrypt messages based on attributes and ac-
cess structures. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) is a type of ABE schemes where the decryption
key is associated with a user’s attribute set. The encryptor
defines the access structure to protect sensitive data such
that only users whose attributes satisfy the access structure
can decrypt the messages. Due to this nice property, CP-
ABE has attracted a lot of attention (e.g. [8], [9], [10]) in
applications such as access control.
Many CP-ABE schemes (e.g. [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]
[16] [17] [18] [19]) have been proposed for various pur-
poses such as short ciphertext and full security proofs.
However, we found no CP-ABE scheme with expressive
access structures in the literature addressing the size issue
of decryption keys, which seems to be a drawback due
to resource consumption. All existing CP-ABE schemes
suffer from the issue of long decryption keys, in which the
length is dependent on the number of attributes. This issue
becomes more obvious, when CP-ABE decryption keys
are applied to storage-constrained devices. Because of the
popularity of lightweight devices and useful applications of
CP-ABE, in this work, we propose a provably secure CP-
ABE scheme that offers short decryption keys, which are
applicable for key storage in lightweight devices.
A. Our Contributions
We propose a ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion in which the access structures are AND gates [13]
[16]. A decryption key associated with an attribute set A
can decrypt ciphertxts with the access structure P when
P ⊆ A. Mostly important, the decryption key is constant-
size and independent of the number of attributes. More
precisely, the decryption key is composed of two group
elements only and the size can be 672 bits at most under
80-bit security requirement. The proposed CP-ABE scheme
is provably secure in the selective security model.
A detailed comparison of ABE is given in Table I
(Section IV). The comparison shows that our scheme is
the only expressive CP-ABE with constant-size decryption
keys. Since the key size is constant and small, our CP-
ABE scheme allows all applications with key storage in
lightweight devices.
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Fig. 1. A security use of decryption with decryption keys stored in storage-constrained devices.
B. Related Work
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) was first introduced by
Sahai and Waters in [20]. There are two variants of ABE:
Key-Policy ABE and Ciphertext-Policy ABE [11].
• KP-ABE: In a KP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext en-
crypting a message is associated with a set of at-
tributes. A decryption key issued by an authority is
associated with an access structure. The ciphertext can
be decrypted with the decryption key if and only if the
attribute set of ciphertext satisfies the access structure
of decryption key.
• CP-ABE: In a CP-ABE scheme, on the contrary, the
ciphertext encrypts a message with an access structure
while a decryption key is associated with a set of
attributes. The decryption condition is similar: if and
only if the attribute set fulfils the access structure.
Many KP-ABE schemes [20] [11] [21] [22] [23] and CP-
ABE schemes [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]
have been proposed in the literature. In comparison with
KP-ABE, CP-ABE is more appropriate in access control
applications since it enables message encryptor to choose
the access structure to decide who can access the message.
The notion of CP-ABE was first proposed by Goyal et al.
in [11] but they did not offer any construction [12]. Soon
after that, Bethencourt, Sahai and Waters [12] proposed the
first CP-ABE construction. Then, Cheung and Newport [13]
proposed another CP-ABE in which the access structures
are AND gates.
CP-ABE towards constant-size ciphertexts have been
proposed. Herranz et al. [17] and Chen et al. [22] proposed
CP-ABE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts under the
threshold access structure. Zhou and Huang [16] proposed a
CP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts under AND
gates access structure. CP-ABE schemes with constant-size
ciphertexts are also studied in [24] [25].
Most of CP-ABE schemes in the literature have linear-
size decryption keys. The only proposed scheme with
constant-size key is proposed in [15]. However, the access
structure is (n, n)-threshold, where the required attributes
in the access structure and the user’s attributes must be the
same. This access structure does not fulfil the motivation
of ABE for fuzzy decryption. In Section IV, we show
there exists a simple construction of CP-ABE under this
particular access structure.
Most of proposed CP-ABE schemes are provably secure
in the selective security model. Lewko et al. [18] proposed
the first fully secure CP-ABE using composite-order pair-
ing. Okamoto and Takashima [26] proposed a fully secure
and unbounded CP-ABE scheme, where the setup phase
does not need to fix the maximum number of attributes.
Lewko and Waters [19] developed a new methodology for
utilizing the prior techniques to prove full security of CP-
ABE. Chen et al. [22] proposed a fully secure CP-ABE
with constant-size ciphertexts.
CP-ABE schemes fall into different types of access
structures. They are including AND gates access structure
[13], and threshold access structure [17][22] for short
ciphertexts. For general access structure, there are CP-
ABE schemes based on monotone tree access structure
[12][27] that support AND, OR, and threshold, and based
on LSSS [18] [14] [19] in which any monotonic boolean
formula can be converted into an LSSS representation.
Okamoto and Takashima [26] proposed fully secure CP-
ABE schemes under non-monotone access structure based
on span program. Sahai and Waters [28] proposed the first
ABE schemes for general circuit.
Other ABE schemes are proposed for different pur-
poses. Chase [29] gave a construction of multi-authority
attribute-based encryption. Nishide et al. [30] proposed
ABE schemes with partially hidden access structures. Ho-
henberger and Waters [31] gave a construction of ABE
scheme with fast decryption. Hinek et al. considered the
problem of key cloning for attribute-based encryption in
[32]. Liu et al. proposed white-box traceable CP-ABE with
monotone access structure in [33].
II. PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we give all preliminaries and definitions
associated with ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion.
A. Attribute Definition and Access Structure
We denote by A an attribute. Let {A1, A2, · · · , An} be
the set of all attributes. For convenience, we denote by
subscript i the attribute Ai.
Let A be an attribute set of a user. We define A ⊂
{A1, A2, · · · , An}. In this paper, we represent the attribute
set A with an n-bit string a1a2 · · · an defined as follows.{
ai = 1 : Ai ∈ A
ai = 0 : Ai /∈ A
For example, let n = 4. The 4-bit string A = 1011 means
the attribute set consists of the attributes {A1, A3, A4}. We
use |A| to denote the number of attributes in A.
We consider the AND gate access structure represented
by attributes from {A1, A2, · · · , An}. We utilize P to define
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an access structure specified with attributes. In this paper,
we also represent the P with an n-bit string b1b2 · · · bn
defined as follows.{
bi = 1 : Ai ∈ P
bi = 0 : Ai /∈ P
For example, let n = 4. The 4-bit string P = 1001 means
the access structure P requires {A1, A4} attributes. We use
|P| to denote the number of attributes in P.
In the rest of this paper, the attribute set A and the access
structure P will be represented with an n-bit string.
Definition 1: An attribute set A = a1a2 · · · an fulfils the
access structure P = b1b2 · · · bn if for all i = 1 to n, the
two bits ai and bi satisfies ai ≥ bi. We write P ⊆ A for
the shorthand of A fulfilling P.
The above definition is based on the representation of
bit strings, and useful in our scheme description. To easily
understand the definition, we can view A and P as a set of
attributes. We have A fulfilling P if P is a subset of A.
B. Definitions
A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is
composed of four algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and
Decrypt.
• Setup: Taking as input a security parameter λ and
a universe of attributes {A1, A2, · · · , An}, the setup
algorithm outputs public parameters MPK and a
master secret key MSK.
• Encrypt: Taking as input the access structure P,
public parameters MPK and a message, the encrypt
algorithm Enc[P,M ] outputs a ciphertext C.
• KeyGen: Taking as input a subset of attributes A,
public parameters MPK and the master secret key
MSK, the key generation algorithm outputs the de-
cryption key of A, which is denoted by skA.
• Decrypt: Taking as input a ciphertext C generated
with access policy P, public parameters MPK and the
decryption key skA corresponding to the attribute set
A, the decryption algorithm Dec[C,P, skA,A] outputs
the message M or outputs ⊥.
The correctness of CP-ABE must satisfy that for any
(MPK,MSK), ciphertext Enc[P,M ] and skA, if P ⊆ A,
the decryption algorithm always outputs the corrected mes-
sage M . Otherwise, the message in Enc[P,M ] cannot be
decrypted using skA.
C. Security Model
Let A be the adversary who tries to attack an encrypted
message without a decryption key whose attributes satisfy
the message’s access policy. The game between an adver-
sary and a challenger is described as follows.
• Initiation: The adversary outputs the n-bit string of
access policy P∗ that it wants to attack.
• Setup: The challenger generates a key pair
(MPK,MSK) with a security parameter λ,
and sends MPK to the adversary.
• Query: The adversary can make the following queries
to the challenger.
– the decryption key skAi for any Ai.
– the decryption on a ciphertext Dec[P,M ].
• Challenge: In this phase, the adversary outputs
(M1,M2) for challenge. It requires the adversary did
not query a decryption key on A satisfying P∗ ⊆
A. The challenger responds by picking a random
c∗ ∈ {0, 1} and outputs the ciphertext Enc[P∗,Mc∗ ]for
challenge to the adversary.
• Query: The adversary can continue decryption key
query and decryption query except with decryption key
query on any A satisfying P∗ ⊆ A and the decryption
query on Enc[P∗,Mc∗ ].
• The adversary outputs a guess c∗g of c
∗ and wins the
game if c∗g = c
∗.
The CP-ABE scheme is (t, qe, qc, ε) selectively secure
against chosen-ciphertext attack if for all t-polynomial time
adversaries who make qe decryption key queries at most
and qc decryption queries at most, we have ε is a negligible
function of λ.
D. Cryptographic Background
Let BG = (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, p, e) be the pairing
group. More precisely, G1,G2 are the elliptic group, and
GT is the multiplicative group. The three groups are of the
same order p. g1 is a generator of G1 and g2 is a generator
of G2. e is the bilinear map capturing the three properties:
• For all g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have
e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab.
• If g is a generator of G1 and h is a generator of G2,
we have e(g, h) is a generator of GT .
• There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h)
for all g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2.
III. OUR CP-ABE WITH CONSTANT-SIZE KEYS
In this section, we give the construction of CP-ABE
with constant-size keys. The decryption key of an attribute
set A is composed of one group element from G1 and
another group element from G2, which is independent of
the number of attributes in A.
A. Proposed Scheme
1) Setup: Taking as input a security parameter λ and a
universe of attributes {A1, A2, · · · , An} and supposing the
attribute Ai is mapped to the index i for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
the setup algorithm works as follows.
• Choose a pairing group BG = (G1,G2,GT , p, e) and
its two random generators g ∈ G1 and h ∈ G2.
Compute e(g, h).
• Pick a random α ∈ Zp and compute vi, hi as follows.
vi = g
αi for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
hi = h
αi for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
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• Select four collision-resistant hash functions:
H1, H4 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}lσ
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}lm
Here, lσ denotes the length of a random string under
the security parameter and lm denotes the length of
message (data).
The parameters (MPK,MSK) are set as
MPK =
(
vi, h, hi, e(g, h),BG, H1, H2, H3, H4
)
,
MSK = (α, g).
2) Encrypt: Our encryption is based the Fujisaki-
Okamoto approach for the security against chosen-
ciphertext adversary [34]:
E
(
σ,H4(P,M, σ)
)
, H3(σ)⊕M,
where E
(
σ,H4(P,M, σ)
)
denotes an attribute-based en-
cryption on σ using the hashing output r = H4(P,M, σ)
as the random number. More precisely, σ is encrypted
with e(g, h)r, denoted by C3 in our ciphertext. The
encryption algorithm also consists of other components
(C1, C2,1, C2,2, · · · , C2,n−|P|+1) for decryptors with a
valid decryption key to compute e(g, h)r. The encryption
algorithm formally defines as follows.
Taking as input a message M , MPK and the access policy
P (|P| 6= 0), the encryption algorithm works as follows.
• Pick a random σ ∈ {0, 1}lσ and compute
r = H4(P,M, σ).
• Let P = b1b2 · · · bn be the policy string. Compute
f(α,P) as
f(x,P) =
n∏
i=1
(
x+H1(i)
)1−bi
,
where f(x,P) is an (n−1)-degree at most polynomial
function in Zp[x]. Let fi be the coefficient of xi.
• Compute C1 as
C1 =
(
hf(α,P)
)r
=
(
hf0
n−1∏
i=1
hfii
)r
.
• Compute C2,i for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n− |P|+ 1 as
C2,i = v
r
i .
• Compute e(g, h)r and (C3, C4) as
C3 = H2
(
e(g, h)r
)
⊕ σ
C4 = H3(σ)⊕M.
• Output the ciphertext on M as(
P, C1, C2,1, C2,2, · · · , C2,n−|P|+1, C3, C4
)
.
3) KeyGen: Taking as input an attribute set A, MPK
and the master secret key MSK, the key generation algo-
rithm works as follows.
• Let A = a1a2 · · · an be the attribute string. Compute
f(α,A) as
f(α,A) =
n∏
i=1
(
α+H1(i)
)1−ai
,
where f(x,A) is an n-degree at most polynomial
function in Zp[x].
• Pick a random s ∈ Zp and generate the decryption key
for A as
skA =
(
g
s
f(α,A) , h
s−1
α
)
.
According to the definition of polynomial functions
f(x,A) in the key generation and f(x,P) in the encryption,
we have
f(x,P)
f(x,A)
=
n∏
i=1
(x+ i)ai−bi .
If P ⊆ A, it is not hard to verify that f(x,P)f(x,A) is a polynomial
function in x. Otherwise, it is not a polynomial. We design
the encryption and decryption key where f(x,P)f(x,A) must be a
polynomial for a successful decryption.
4) Decrypt: The main task of decryption is to compute
e(g, h)r, which is used to compute σ for extracting message
M . The decryption algorithm is defined as follows.
• If A = a1a2 · · · an does not fulfil the policy P, abort.
Otherwise, compute ci for i = 1, 2, · · · , n as
ci = ai − bi ∈ {0, 1}.
Let F (x,A,P) be the (n − |P|)-degree at most poly-
nomial function in Zp[x] defined as
F (x) = F (x,A,P) =
n∏
i=1
(
x+H1(i)
)ci
,
and Fi ∈ Zp be the coefficient of xi. We have F0 6= 0.
• Compute (U, V,W ) as
U = e
(
C2,1,
n−|P|∏
i=1
hFii−1
)
= e(g, h)rF (α)−rF0
V = e
( n−|P|+1∏
i=1
C
Fi−1
2,i , h
s−1
α
)
= e(g, h)rsF (α)−rF (α)
W = e
(
g
s
f(α,A) , C1) = e(g, h)
rsF (α).
• Compute
e(g, h)r =
( W
U · V
) 1
F0
.
• Compute the randomness σ by
σ = H2
(
e(g, h)r
)
⊕ C3
and the message M by
M = H3(σ)⊕ C4.
• Compute r = H4(P,M, σ) and verify the ciphertext
is encrypted with r. If it is false, output ⊥; otherwise,
output M as the decryption of the ciphertext.
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B. Correctness
The correctness of our encryption and decryption is
showed as follows.
f(x,P) =
n∏
i=1
(x+H1(i))
1−bi ,
f(x,A) =
n∏
i=1
(x+H1(i))
1−ai ,
f(x,P)
f(x,A)
=
n∏
i=1
(x+H1(i))
(1−bi)−(1−ai)
=
n∏
i=1
(x+H1(i))
ai−bi
=
n∏
i=1
(x+H1(i))
ci .
Therefore, we have
F (x) = F (x,A,P) =
n∏
i=1
(x+H1(i))
ci =
f(x,P)
f(x,A)
.
and F (x) is a polynomial function when ci ∈ {0, 1} holds
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n. The equation of (U, V,W ) and
e(g, h)r are correct because
U = e
(
C2,1,
n−|P|∏
i=1
hFii−1
)
= e
(
grα,
n−|P|∏
i=1
hα
i−1Fi
)
= e(g, h)r
∑n−|P|
i=1 α
iFi+rF0−rF0
= e(g, h)rF (α)−rF0 ,
V = e
( n−|P|+1∏
i=1
C
Fi−1
2,i , h
s−1
α
)
= e
(
grαF (α), h
s−1
α
)
= e(g, h)rsF (α)−rF (α),
W = e(g
s
f(α,A) , C1)
= e
(
g
s
f(α,A) , hrf(α,P)
)
= e(g, h)rsF (α),( W
UV
) 1
F0
=
( e(g, h)rsF (α)
e(g, h)rF (α)−rF0e(g, h)rsF (α)−rF (α)
) 1
F0
=
(
e(g, h)rF0
) 1
F0
= e(g, h)r.
IV. EFFICIENCY
In this section, we compare our scheme to other proposed
CP-ABE in the literature.
The decryption key of our scheme is composed of two
group elements only, and is independent of the number of
attributes. The ciphertext mainly has n − |P| + 2 group
elements depending on the total attribute number and the
number of attributes in access policy.
Table I shows the comparison of recently proposed
attribute-based encryption schemes in terms of policy type,
access structure, security model, length of decryption key
and length of ciphertext. We compare the efficiency of
schemes under CPA (chosen plaintext attack) security only
as previous schemes utilized different generalized security
transformation from CPA to CCA. In this table, |A| denotes
the number of attributes of a user and |P| denotes the
number of attributes of access policy. We use G to denote
the elliptic groups of G1 and G2 for prime-order bilinear
pairing, and use Gc,GTc to denote composite-order pairing.
The comparison shows that only our scheme and the
scheme proposed in [15] achieve constant-size decryption
keys.
However, our scheme provides a more expressive access
structure compared to [15]. Notice that [15] admits only
(n, n)-threshold decryption policies [17]. In their scheme,
a decryption key associated with attribute set A can only
decrypt a ciphertext generated from an access policy P
fulfilling A = P. While in our CP-ABE scheme, a decryp-
tion key associated with attribute set A can decrypt any
ciphertext under any access policy P satisfying P ⊆ A.
We notice that it is not hard to construct CP-ABE with
A = P access structure, where the the attribute set A of a
decryption key must be equivalent to the access polity P.
We can merely use a traditional identity-based encryption
scheme to achieve this CP-ABE by setting A = ID
and P = ID′ as unique identities. A message encrypted
with ID′ is decrypted with the decryption key of ID
when ID = ID′. The only problem we need to address
is how to map an attribute set A into a unique string
ID. Let A = {A1, A2, · · · , An} and H be a collision-
resistant hash function. We set ID to be the output of
H(Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Ain) for H(Ai1) < H(Ai2) < · · · <
H(Ain). It is not hard to verify that such a modification
from any IBE can be used to construct CP-ABE with A = P
access structure.
Our proposed CP-ABE scheme is feasible for key storage
in lightweight devices with limited-memory storage, like
passive tags in RFID system. Suppose an RFID tag should
carry both possessed attributes A and the corresponding
decryption key skA. We can choose the pairing group G1
with 160 bits and G2 with 512 bits (under compression
[35]) for 80-bit security so that |skA| = |G1|+ |G2| = 672
bits. Suppose the total attribute number is n = 1000, we
have |A| = 1000. We yield |A+ skA| = 1672 bits. This is
applicable for passive tags whose memory size has a few
kilo bits only [1].
Our scheme is also comparable to other proposed CP-
ABE schemes (Table I) in terms of computational effi-
ciency. Our decryption key generation for each attribute set
only costs two point multiplications, which is independent
of the number of attributes and is much more efficient than
the others with linear size decryption keys. Since f(x,P)
is an (n−|P|)-degree polynomial, our encryption therefore
costs about 2(n − |P|) point multiplications. We have
F (x,A,P) is an (|A| − |P|)-degree polynomial, and hence
our decryption mainly costs about 2(|A|− |P|) point multi-
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEMES.
Schemes KP/CP-ABE Access Structure Security Model Length of Decryption Key Length of Ciphertext
SW[20] KP-ABE Threshold Selective Security nG nG+ GT
GPSW[11] KP-ABE Tree Selective Security |A|G |P|G+ GT
OSW[21] KP-ABE Tree Selective Security 2|A|G (|P|+ 1)G+ GT
BSW[12] CP-ABE Tree Selective Security (2|A|+ 1)G (2|P|+ 1)G+ GT
HLR[17] CP-ABE Threshold Selective Security (n+ |A|)G 2G+ GT
CCLZFLW[22] KP/CP-ABE Threshold Full Security O(n2) O(1)
EMONS[15] CP-ABE (n, n)-Threshold Selective Security 2G 2G+ GT
LOSTW [18] CP-ABE LSSS Full Security (|A|+ 2)Gc (2|P|+ 1)Gc + GTc
Waters[14] CP-ABE LSSS Selective Security (|A|+ 2)G (2|P+ 1|)G+ GT
ALP[23] KP-ABE LSSS Selective Security 3|A|G 2G+ GT
LW[19] CP-ABE LSSS Full Security (|A|+ 3)Gc (2|P|+ 2)Gc + GTc
CN[13] CP-ABE AND gates Selective Security (2|A|+ 1)G (|P|+ 1)G+ GT
ZH[16] CP-ABE AND gates Selective Security (|A|+ 1)G 2G+ GT
Our Scheme CP-ABE AND gates Selective Security 2G (n− |P|+ 2)G+ GT
plications and three pairing computations. Both encryption
and decryption are still efficient in linear time. We note
that the efficiency of encryption and decryption in other
schemes are also with regards to the input attribute number
or threshold number. Our scheme offers short decryption
key and therefore it does not trade off the computational
efficiency.
V. SECURITY
Before proving the security of our CP-ABE scheme, we
define the adopted hard problem for security reduction.
Let a pairing group be BG = (p,G1,G2, GT , e). Let
f(x) and g(x) be two co-prime polynomials in Zp[x] with
respective orders q1, q2. Let g0 be a generator of G1 and
h0 be a generator of G2. Given
g0, g
α
0 , g
α2
0 , · · · , gα
q1−1
0
h0, h
α
0 , h
α2
0 , · · · , hα
n
0
gω0 , g
ωα
0 , g
ωα2
0 , · · · , gωα
q1
0
hω0 , h
ωα
0 , h
ωα2
0 , · · · , hωα
n
0
g
αf(α)
0 , g
α2f(α)
0 , · · · , g
αnf(α)
0
g
γαf(α)
0 , g
γα2f(α)
0 , · · · , g
γαnf(α)
0 , h
γg(α)
0
and T ∈ GT , the (q1, q2, n)-aMSE-DDH problem is decid-
ing whether T is equal to e(g0, h0)γf(α) or is a random
element of GT .
Definition 2: The (q1, q2, n)-aMSE-DDH problem is
(t, ε)-hard if for all t-polynomial time adversaries, the
maximum probability of solving this problem is ε.
The hard assumption we adopt is modified from the
aMSE-DDH problem defined in [17]. The intractability
of the modified (q1, q2, n)-aMSE-DDH is covered by the
analysis in [2]. Here, we give the intractability analysis
based on the generic group model analysis in [2].
Given the challenge instance, one can compute
g
A(α)
0 , g
αB(α)f(α)
0 , h
C(α)
0 , g
γαD(α)f(α)
0 ,
where
A(x) is any (q1 − 1)-degree polynomial,
B(x) is any (n− 1)-degree polynomial,
C(x) is any (n− 1)-degree polynomial,
D(x) is any (n− 1)-degree polynomial.
With the additional element hγg(α)0 , one can further com-
pute
e(g0, h0)
γA(α)g(α),
e(g0, h0)
γαB(α)f(α)g(α),
e(g0, h0)
γαC(α)D(α)f(α),
where all of them contain the unknown randomness γ.
If e(g0, h0)γf(α) can be computed from the above com-
binations, we should have
γf(α) = γA(α)g(α) + γαB(α)f(α)g(α) +
γαC(α)D(α)f(α).
That is, the polynomial f(x) can be re-written into
f(x) = A(x)g(x) + xB(x)f(x)g(x) + xC(x)D(x)f(x)
= A(x)g(x) + f(x)
(
xB(x)g(x) + xC(x)D(x)
)
We deduce f(x)|A(x) due to the co-prime of f(x) and
g(x). Since the degree of A(x) is less than f(x), we have
A(x) = 0. Therefore, f(x) can be further simplified as
f(x) = f(x)
(
xB(x)g(x) + xC(x)D(x)
)
.
Obviously, from the above, we deduce
E(x) = xB(x)g(x) + xC(x)D(x) ≡ 1.
On the other hand, we have E(0) = 0 which contradicts
E(x) ≡ 1. This contradiction indicates that e(g0, h0)γf(α)
cannot be computed from the challenge instance.
Theorem 1: Our CP-ABE is (t, qe, qc, ε)-secure if the
(q1, q2, n)-aMSE-DDH problem is (t′, ε′)-hard.
t′ = t+O(nqete + nqH4te), ε
′ = ε− qH1
p
,
q1 = |P∗|, q2 = n− |P∗|,
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 7
where te denotes the average time of a point multiplication
in G1, qH1 , qH4 denotes the number of queries to the
random oracles H1 and H4, and |P∗| denotes the number
of bit 1 in P∗.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary who can
break the security with advantage (t, qe, qc, ε). We construct
an algorithm B that solves the (q1, q2, n)-aMSE-DDH prob-
lem with advantage (t′, ε′) at least. The algorithm B is given
the challenge input and the aim is to output T = 1 or 0.
The algorithm B interacts with the adversary A as below.
Initization: The adversary outputs the access policy P∗ to
be challenged, where there are n attributes in total. Let
P∗ = b1b2 · · · bn. B will set
f(x,P∗) =
n∏
i=1
(
x+Hi(i)
)1−bi
= g(x),
n∏
i=1
(
x+Hi(i)
)bi
= f(x),
where g(x) is a (n−|P∗|)-degree polynomial function, and
therefore the degree of f(x) is |P∗|.
Setup: B sets the master secret key the same as α in the
challenge instance. Then, the other components of public
parameters are simulated as follows.
h = h0,
hi = h
αi = hα
i
0 ,
vi = g
αi = g
αif(α)
0 ,
e(g, h) = e(g0, h0)
f(α).
All (vi, hi) directly come from the change instance. e(g, h)
is simulated from g0, gα0 , · · · , gα
q1−1
0 and h0, h
α
0 , f(x). The
challenger gives these parameters to the adversary except-
ing the four hash functions set as random oracles.
Hash Queries: The adversary can access the four ran-
dom oracles H1, H2, H3, H4. B maintains four lists
LH1 ,LH2 ,LH3 ,LH4 to record the query and response,
respectively. If the query has been responded and recorded
in the list, B responds with the same result. For new queries,
B works as follows.
• Let the query to H1 be i. If i /∈ [1, n], B responds
H1(i) with a random number in Zp. Otherwise, for
i ∈ [1, n]. Let P∗ = b1b2 · · · bn. It follows into two
cases:
– bi = 0, B responds Hi(i) with a new root of g(x).
– Otherwise bi = 1, B responds H1(i) with a new
root of f(x).
• H2: Let the query to H2 be e(g, h)ri . B responds
H2(e(g, h)
ri) with a random Ri ∈ {0, 1}lt .
• H3: Let the query to H3 be ti. B responds H3(ti) with
a random Qi ∈ {0, 1}lm .
• Let the query to H4 be (ti,Mi) for data encryption.
B responds H4(ti,Mi) with a random ri ∈ Z∗p.
Query:
For any query on Ai = a1a2 · · · an for decryption key,
we can write f(x,Ai) into
f(x,Ai) =
n∑
i=1
(
x+H1(i)
)1−ai
= ff(x)(x,Ai) · fg(x)(x,Ai),
where all roots of ff(x)(x,Ai) are from f(x), and all roots
of fg(x)(x,Ai) are from g(x). If Ai does not satisfy the
access policy P∗, we must have ff(x)(x,Ai) is not constant
or its degree is nonzero.
Let fg(x)(0,Ai) = fg(0). B randomly chooses si ∈ Zp
and sets
f1Ai(x) =
f(x)
f(x,Ai)
· fg(x)(x,Ai)
(
siωx+
1
fg(0)
)
=
f(x)
ff(x)(x,Ai)
·
(
siωx+
1
fg(0)
)
=
f(x)
ff(x)(x,Ai)
· siωx+
f(x)
ff(x)(x,Ai)
· 1
fg(0)
,
f2Ai(x) =
fg(x)(x,Ai)(siωx+ 1fg(0) )− 1
x
= siωfg(x)(x,Ai) +
fg(x)(x,Ai)
fg(0)
− 1
x
.
We have
f(x)
ff(x)(x,Ai)
· siωx = ω · f1,1Ai (x),
where f1,1Ai (x) is a q1-degree at most polynomial function;
f(x)
ff(x)(x,Ai)
· 1
fg(0)
= f1,2Ai (x),
where f1,2Ai (x) is a (q1 − 1)-degree at most polynomial
function;
siωfg(x)(x,Ai) = ω · f2,1Ai (x),
where f2,1Ai (x) is a q2-degree at most polynomial function;
fg(x)(x,Ai)
fg(0)
− 1
x
= 0 or f2,2Ai (x),
where f2,2Ai (x) is a (q2 − 1)-degree at most polynomial
function.
B computes skAi as
skAi = (d1, d2)
=
(
g
f1Ai
(α)
0 , h
f2A2
(α)
0
)
=
(
g
ωf1,1Ai
(α)+f1,2Ai
(α)
0 , h
ωf2,1Ai
(α)+f2,2Ai
(α)
0
)
,
where d1, d2 are computed as follows.
g
ωf1,1Ai
(α)
0 ←− gω0 , gαω0 , · · · , gα
q1ω
0 , f
1,1
Ai (x).
g
f1,2Ai
(α)
0 ←− g0, gα0 , · · · , gα
q1−1
0 , f
1,2
Ai (x).
h
ωf2,1Ai
(α)
0 ←− hω0 , hαω0 , · · · , hα
q2ω
0 , f
2,1
Ai (x).
h
f2,2Ai
(α)
0 ←− h0, hα0 , · · · , hα
q2−1
0 , f
2,2
Ai (x).
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Let s′ = fg(α)(α,Ai)(siωα+ 1fg(0) ), we have
g
s′
f(α,Ai) = g
f1Ai
(α)
0 ,
h
s′−1
α = h
f2Ai
(α)
0 ,
which is a valid decryption key on Ai. B computes the
decryption key and sends it to the adversary.
For any decryption query on Enc[Mi,Pi], if there exist
(ti,Mi, ri, Ri, Qi) in the query lists such that the ciphertext
is generated using these parameters, B outputs Mi as the
decryption query. Otherwise, B outputs ⊥. No query will be
aborted since all valid encryptions need the response from
hash oracles, and the response contains the randomness ri
for encryption.
Challenge: The adversary outputs (M0,M1) for challenge
where the queried decryption key does not fulfil the access
policy P∗. B randomly chooses R∗ ∈ {0, 1}lt , Q∗ ∈
{0, 1}lm and computes the challenge ciphertext as
C∗1 = h
γg(α)
0 ,
C∗2,i = g
γαif(α)
0 ,
C3 = R
∗,
C4 = Q
∗.
Let the randomness r be r = γ, we have
C∗1 = h
γg(α)
0 = (h
f(α,P∗))r,
C∗2,i = g
γαif(α)
0 = g
γαi = vri .
(C∗1 , C
∗
2,1, · · · , C∗2,n−|P∗|+1) is a valid encryption of policy
P∗ with randomness r. The decryption needs to compute
e(g, h)r. If T = e(g0, h0)γf(α), we have
e(g, h)r = e(g
f(α)
0 , h0)
γ = T.
Query: The response of this phase is the same as the former
phase with the restriction that no decryption key query
fulfilling the challenge policy and no decryption query on
the challenge ciphertext.
Guess: The adversary output a guess of c∗ and the chal-
lenger outputs 1 if there exists a query on T to the H1
oracle; otherwise, T is a random element of GT .
In the guess phase, when the adversary can break the
encryption with probability ε, e(g, h)r appears in the LH1
list with probability ε at least. The only error event is that
T is a randomness but it is queried to H1 oracle. This
occurs with probability qH1/p at most. Therefore, B can
distinguish T = 1 or T = 0 with probability ε− qH1/p at
least.
The simulation time is dominated by the decryption
key generation and the decryption. Each key generation
requires O(n) point multiplications, and all decryption
requires O(qH4n) point multiplications, where qH4 denotes
the query number of the H4 oracle. We therefore obtain the
Theorem 1 and prove the security of our proposed scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lightweight devices usually have a limited-memory stor-
age, which could be too small to store the decryption keys
of CP-ABE schemes, as the key size of existing CP-ABE
schemes is linear to or dependent on the number of users’
attributes. In this work, we proposed a provably secure CP-
ABE scheme with AND gates access structure. Our CP-
ABE scheme offers a constant-size decryption key whose
length can be as small as 672 bits (80-bit security). The
comparison showed that our scheme is the only expressive
CP-ABE in which the decryption key can be stored in
lightweight devices.
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